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Abstract. In monolithic operating systems, the kernel is the piece of
code that executes with the highest privileges and has control over all
the software running on a host. A successful attack against an operating
system’s kernel means a total and complete compromise of the running
system. These attacks usually end with the installation of a rootkit, a
stealthy piece of software running with kernel privileges. When a rootkit
is present, no guarantees can be made about the correctness, privacy or
isolation of the operating system.
In this paper we present Hello rootKitty, an invariance-enforcing frame-
work which takes advantage of current virtualization technology to pro-
tect a guest operating system against rootkits. Hello rootKitty uses the
idea of invariance to detect maliciously modified kernel data structures
and restore them to their original legitimate values. Our prototype has
negligible performance and memory overhead while effectively protecting
commodity operating systems from modern rootkits.
Keywords: rootkits, virtualization, detection, invariance
1 Introduction
Operating systems consist of trusted software that executes directly on top of
a host’s hardware providing abstraction, arbitration, isolation and security to
the rest of the software. Due to their prominent position, operating systems
have been a common target of attackers who try to circumvent their protection
mechanisms and modify them to their advantage. In the past, a program that
allowed a user to elevate his access and become a system administrator (“root”)
was called a rootkit. Today the meaning of rootkits has changed and is used to
describe software that hides the attacker’s presence from the legitimate system’s
administrator. Kernel-mode rootkits1 target the core of an operating system
and thus they are the hardest to detect and remove. In extreme cases, a kernel-
mode rootkit may be introduced by a software bug in the kernel, triggered by a
1 Such rootkits appear very often in the form of device drivers (Microsoft Windows)
or Loadable Kernel Modules (Linux kernel).
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malicious or a benign but-exploitable process. Regardless of the way the rootkit is
introduced, the result is malicious code running with operating system privileges
which can add and execute additional code or modify existent kernel code. The
activities resulting from a successful attack can range from spamming and key-
logging to stealing private user-data and disabling security software running on
the host. In the past, rootkits have also been used to turn their targets into nodes
of a botnet as with Storm Worm [9] or to perform massive bank frauding [13].
Even rootkits that do not introduce new code, but rather make use of existing
fragments of code to fabricate their malicious functions, need to somehow have
these fragments executed in the order of their choosing [10]. Changing the control
flow of the kernel involves either changing specific kernel objects such as function
pointers or overwriting existing fragments of code with new code. Using the
idea of modified kernel-data structures as a sign of rootkits, security researchers
have developed several approaches to mitigate rootkits. Unfortunately, many of
these are affected by considerable overhead [8,16] or miss a fundamental security
requirement such as isolation[32].
Isolation is needed to prevent a countermeasure in the target system from
being disabled/crippled by a potential attack.
Other countermeasures have been presented in which operating system ker-
nels are protected against rootkits by executing only authenticated (or validated)
kernel code [24,22,16]. The aforementioned rootkit [10] that doesn’t introduce
new kernel code and re-uses fragments of authenticated code bypasses such coun-
termeasures. In [19] a countermeasure to detect changes of the kernel’s control
flow graph is presented; Anh et al. [14] uses virtualization technology and em-
ulation to perform malware analysis and [29] protects kernel function pointers.
Another interesting work is [23] which gives more attention to kernel rootkit pro-
filing and reveals key aspects of the rootkit behavior by the analysis of compro-
mised kernel objects. Determining which kernel objects are modied by a rootkit
not only provides an overview of the damage inflicted on the target but is also an
important step to design and implement systems to detect and prevent rootkits.
A rising trend in security research is the use of virtualization technology for
non-virtualization specific purposes [7,21,5,4]. The property that makes virtu-
alization particularly attractive, from a security perspective, is that isolation
is guaranteed by the current virtualization-enabled hardware. Using the ap-
propriate instruction primitives of such hardware, makes it straightforward to
fully separate and isolate the target from the monitor system. In this paper we
present Hello rootKitty, a lightweight invariance-enforcing framework to miti-
gate kernel-mode rootkits in common operating system kernels. We start from
the observation that many critical kernel data structures are invariant. Many
data structures used by rootkits to change the control-flow of the kernel con-
tain values that would normally stay unchanged for the lifetime of a running
kernel. Our protection system consists of a monitor that checks the contents of
data structures that need to be protected at regular times and detects whether
their contents have changed. If a change is detected, our system warns the ad-
ministrator of the exploited kernel and corrects the problem by restoring the
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modified data structures to their original contents. Our monitor runs inside a
hypervisor and protects operating systems that are being virtualized. Due to
the hardware-guarantees of isolation that virtualization provides, an attacker
has no way of disabling our monitor or tamper with the memory areas that our
system uses. Hello rootKitty imposes negligible performance overhead on the vir-
tualized system and it doesn’t require kernel-wide changes other than a trusted
module to communicate the invariant data structures from the guest operat-
ing system to the hypervisor. Hello rootKitty can be integrated with existing
invariance-inferencing engines and protect commodity operating systems run-
ning on virtualized environments. Alternatively, our system can be used directly
by kernel developers to protect their invariant structures from rootkit attacks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the problem
of rootkits and presents our attacker model. Section 3 presents our solution. In
Section 3.1 we present the architectural details of Hello rootKitty followed by
its implementation in Section 3.2. We evaluate our prototype implementation in
Section 4 and present its limitations in Section 5. We discuss related work on
rootkit detection in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Problem description
In this section we describe common rootkit technology and we also present the
model of the attacker that our system can detect and neutralize.
2.1 Rootkits
Rootkits are pieces of software that attackers deploy in order to hide their pres-
ence from a system. Rootkits can be classified according to the privilege-level
which they require to operate. The two most common rootkit classes are: a)
user-mode and b) kernel-mode.
User-mode rootkits run in the user-space of a system without the need of
tampering with the kernel. In Windows, user-mode rootkits commonly modify
the loaded copies of the Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) that each application
loads in its address space [28]. More specifically, an attacker can modify function
pointers of specific Windows APIs and execute their own code before and/or
after the execution of the legitimate API call. In Linux, user-mode rootkits
hide themselves mainly by changing standard linux utilities, such as ps and
ls. Depending on the privileges of the executing user, the rootkit can either
modify the default executables or modify the user’s profile in a way that their
executables will be called instead of the system ones (e.g.,by changing the PATH
variable in the Bash shell).
Kernel-mode rootkits run in the kernel-space of an operating system and are
thus much stronger and much more capable. The downside, from an attacker’s
perspective, is that the user must have enough privileges to introduce new code
in the kernel-space of each operating system. In Windows, kernel-mode rootkits
are loaded as device-drivers and target locations such as the call gate for
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interrupt handling or the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT). The rootkits
change these addresses (hooking) so that their code can execute before specific
system calls. In Linux, rootkits can be loaded either as a Loadable Kernel Module
(LKM) or written directly in the memory of the kernel through the /dev/mem
and /dev/kmem file [20]. These rootkits target kernel-data structures in the same
way that their Windows-counterparts do. Although this paper focuses on Linux
kernel-mode rootkits, the concepts introduced apply equally well to Windows
kernel-mode rootkits. An empirical observation is that kernel-mode rootkits need
to corrupt specific kernel objects, in order to execute their own code and add
malicious functionality to the victim kernel. Studies of common rootkits [17,19]
show that most dangerous and insidious rootkits change function pointers in the
system call table, interrupt descriptor table or in the file system, to point to
malicious code. The attack is triggered by calling the relative system call from
user space or by handling an exception or, in general, by calling the function
whose function pointer has been compromised. We report a list of rootkits which
compromise the target kernel in Table 1.
Rootkit Description
Adore, afhrm, Rkit, Rial, kbd, All-
root, THC, heroin, Synapsis, itf, kis
Modify system call table
SuckIT Modify interrupt handler
Adore-ng Hijack function pointers of
fork(), write(), open(),
close(), stat64(), lstat64()
and getdents64()
Knark Add hooks to /proc file system
Table 1. Hooking methods of common linux rootkits
2.2 Attacker Model
In this work we first assume that the operating system which is being attacked is
virtualized, i.e., it runs on top of a hypervisor which has more privileges than the
operating system itself. Virtualization guarantees isolation thus we assume that
the guest operating system cannot access the memory or code of the hypervisor.
Our system detects the rootkit after it has been deployed, a fact which allows
our model to include all possible ways of introducing a rootkit in a system. Thus,
a rootkit can be introduced either by:
– A privileged user loading the rootkit as a Loadable Kernel Module
– A privileged user loading the rootkit by directly overwriting memory parts
through the /dev/ memory interfaces
– An unprivileged user exploiting a vulnerability in the kernel of the running
operating system which will allow him to execute arbitrary code
Hello rootKitty: A lightweight invariance-enforcing framework 5
Finally, our system doesn’t rely on secrecy so our model of the attacker includes
him being aware of the protection system.
3 Hello rootKitty: protecting kernel data against rootkits
In this section we describe our approach to detect rootkits that compromise
function pointers or data structures residing in the kernel.
3.1 Approach
By studying the most common rootkits and their hooking techniques one can
realize that they share at least one common characteristic. In order to achieve
execution of their malicious code, rootkits overwrite locations in kernel memory
which are used to dictate, at some point, the control-flow inside the kernel. Most
of these locations are very specific (see Table 1) and their values are normally
invariant, i.e. they don’t change over the normal execution of the kernel. Since
these objects are normally invariant, any sign of variance can be used to detect
the presence of rootkits. We use the terminology of “critical kernel objects” to
name objects that can be used by an attacker to change the control-flow of the
kernel. The approach of Hello rootKitty is, given a list of invariant critical kernel
objects, to periodically check them for signs of variance. When our countermea-
sure detects that the contents of an invariant critical kernel object have been
modified, it will report an ongoing attack. Invariant critical kernel objects have
been identified in several contributions, such as [29,2,3,6]. The methods to de-
tect invariance differ depending on the type of critical kernel object and are the
following:
1. Static kernel objects at addresses hardcoded and not dependent on kernel
compilation
2. Static kernel objects dependent on kernel compilation (e.g., provided by
/boot/System.map in a regular Linux kernel)
3. Dynamic kernel objects allocated on the heap by kmalloc, vmalloc and the
rest of the kernel-specific memory allocation functions
Identifying and protecting static kernel objects (type 1 and type 2) is straight-
forward. During the installation of the operating system to be monitored, a vir-
tual machine installer would know in advance whether the guest is of Windows
or Unix type. This is the minimal information required to detect kernel objects
whose addresses have been hardcoded (type 1). Moreover, the Linux operating
system provides System.map, where compilation-dependent addresses of critical
kernel objects are stored (type 2). In contrast, identifying dynamic kernel objects
(type 3) needs much more effort and depends on the invariance detection algo-
rithm in place. Part of our countermeasure is a trusted module which operates
in the guest operating system at boot time. Boot time is considered our root of
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trust. We are confident this to be a realistic assumption. 2 From this point on,
the system is considered to operate in an untrusted environment and a regular
integrity checking of the protected objects is necessary to preserve the system’s
safety. Given a list of invariant kernel objects, the trusted module communicates
this data (virtual address and size) of the kernel objects to observe after boot,
and stores them in the guest’s address space. Then it will raise a hypercall in
order to send the collected entries to the hypervisor. The hypervisor will check-
sum the contents mapped at the addresses provided by the trusted module and
will store their hashes in its address space, which is not accessible to the guest.
The trusted module is then forced to unload via a end-of-operation message sent
by the hypervisor. Hello rootKitty doesn’t accept objects after the kernel has
booted, in order to prevent a possible Denial-Of-Service attack launched by an
attacker who is aware of the presence of our system. It is important to point
out that Hello rootKitty is not a invariance-detection system for critical kernel
objects and thus it must be provided with a list of kernel objects on which it
will enforce invariance. This list can be either generated by invariance detection
systems [29,2,3,6] or manually compiled by kernel and kernel-module developers.
hypervisor
guest kernel
trusted 
module
(1)
(2)
(3)
shared memory
private memory
(4)
(5)
Fig. 1. High level view of trusted module-hypervisor interaction
Although implementing countermeasures in a separated virtual machine or
within the hypervisor increases the degree of security via isolation, it often leads
to higher performance overhead than the equivalent implementation in the target
system. A challenging task is that of checking integrity outside of the target
2 Boot time ends right before calling kernel thread which starts init, the first userspace
application of the Linux kernel. At this stage the kernel is booted, initialized and all
the required device drivers have been loaded.
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operating system while limiting the performance overhead. We achieve this by
exploiting the regular interaction of a Virtual Machine Monitor and the guest
operating system. In a virtualized environment the guest’s software stack runs
on a logical processor in VMX non-root operation [11]. This mode differs from
the ordinary operation mode because certain instructions executed by the guest
kernel may cause a VMExit. A VMExit, is a transition from VMX non-root mode
to VMX root mode. After a VMExit the hypervisor will gain control of the
CPU and will handle the exception. When the handler terminates the hypervisor
performs a VMEntry and returns the control to the guest which will load the latest
state of the logical processor and resume execution in VMX non-root mode. Our
countermeasure performs integrity checks every time the guest kernel writes to
a control register (MOV CR* event) which in-turn causes a VMExit. Trapping
this event is strategic because when virtual addressing is enabled, the upper 20
bits of control register 3 (CR3) become the page directory base register (PDBR).
This register is fundamental to locate the page directory and the page tables for
the current task. Whenever the guest kernel schedules a new process (process
switch) the guest CR3 is modified. Performing integrity checks on the MOV CR*
events is a convenient way to keep detection time and performance overhead
to a minimum while guaranteeing a high level of security on protected objects.
Moreover, this choice allows a constraint relaxation to improve performance even
more by paying a small cost in terms of detection time. We provide more details
for our constraint relaxation in Section 3.2. Alternatively the hypervisor could
check integrity randomly during the execution of the guest operating system. But
this would not scale according to the guest system load as our current approach
does.
3.2 Implementation
In this section we discuss the implementation details of Hello rootKitty. We con-
sider the choice of the hypervisor of critical importance in order to limit the
overhead of the entire system. In fact, countermeasures implemented in virtu-
alized environments are usually affected by considerable overhead which often
prevents their deployment in actual production systems. We developed a pro-
totype of our countermeasure in BitVisor, a tiny Type-I hypervisor [26] which
exploits Intel VT and AMD-V instruction sets. Our target system runs a Linux
kernel with version 2.6.35 and the trusted module has been implemented as a
loadable kernel module for the Linux kernel. Our choice of BitVisor is mainly
due to its memory address translation features. In BitVisor, the guest operating
system and the Virtual Machine Monitor share the same physical address space.
Thus, the VMM does not need any complex mechanism to provide translations
from guest to host virtual addresses. The guest operating system will rely on
the guest page table to perform translations from virtual to physical addresses.
This considerably reduces the size of the hypervisor’s code and has a very low
impact on the overall performance. Unfortunately, in this specific architecture,
the VMM can not directly use the guest page table. Translations of guest virtual
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addresses to host virtual addresses are thus performed by the cooperation of the
trusted module and the hypervisor, as explained later in this section.
Figure 1 presents a high-level view of Hello rootKitty. Our system detects
illegal modifications to invariant critical kernel objects in three phases which are
described below.
Communicating phase The trusted module executes in the guest’s address
space and communicates the addresses and sizes of critical kernel objects to be
protected. In order to test and benchmark our system in a realistic way, we
created an artificial list of critical kernel objects by allocating synthetic kernel
data. For each critical object the trusted module will retrieve its physical address
by calling pa(virtual address), a macro of the Linux kernel. If the kernel object
is stored in one physical frame the trusted module will immediately collect the
start address and the size. If the kernel object is stored on more than one physical
frames the trusted module will store the relative list of physical addresses. When
the virtual addresses of all objects have been translated, a hypercall is raised
which signals the hypervisor to start the integrity checking.
Detection phase In order to detect changes the hypervisor needs to access
the contents at the physical addresses collected by the trusted module. This is
achieved by mapping the physical address and size of each object in its private
memory and computing the signature of its actual contents. When all objects
have been checksummed an end-of-operation flag is set in a memory area shared
with the trusted module, which in turn will be unloaded. The checksum is per-
formed by a procedure which implements MD5. This cryptographic hash function
provides the integrity guarantees needed for our purposes. While stronger hash
functions exist, we believe that the security and collision rate provided by MD5
are strong enough to adequately protect our approach from mimicry attacks.
Repairing phase When the hypervisor detects that the signature of a pro-
tected object is different from the one computed the first time, two different
behaviors are allowed: a) the system will report an ongoing attack or b) the
system attempts to restore the contents of the compromised object if a copy has
been provided by the trusted module. Since the hypervisor and the guest share
the same physical address space, the hypervisor can restore the original content
by mapping the physical address of the compromised object in its virtual space.
The untampered value is then copied and control returns to the guest. The
restoration of modified critical data structures means that, while the rootkit’s
code is still present in the address space of the kernel, it is no longer reachable by
the kernel control-flow and thus it is neutralized. Since switching from VMX-root
to VMX-non-root causes a flush of the TLB, any code in the guest that was using
the compromised object will perform the address translation and memory load
again and will thus load the restored value. As previously mentioned, whenever
task switching, the CR3 register’s contents are changed. Hello rootKitty traps
the MOV CR* event and checks the integrity of the critical kernel objects. This
checking occurs outside of the guest operating system and thus can’t be influ-
enced by it. Since the number of kernel objects might be high, the hypervisor
will perform the integrity checking of only a subset of objects. Control is then
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returned to the guest kernel and another subset of critical kernel objects will be
checked at the next MOV CR* event. While considerably improving the perfor-
mance overhead, this relaxation obviously comes at a cost in terms of security
and detection time. We do believe however, that the resulting detection ability
of Hello rootKitty remains strong, a belief which we explore further in Section
5.
4 Evaluation
We implemented Hello rootKitty in BitVisor (Ver 1.1) and the trusted module
as a loadable kernel module of the Linux kernel. All experiments were performed
on Intel Core 2 Duo 2 Ghz processor with 4GB of RAM.
4.1 Security Evaluation
In order to evaluate whether Hello rootKitty would detect a real rootkit we
downloaded and installed a minimal rootkit [15] which hijacks a system-call
entry, specifically the setuid systemcall, from the system-call table. When the
setuid system call is invoked with the number 31337 as an argument, the rootkit
locates the kernel structure for the calling process and elevates its permissions
to “root”. The way of hijacking entries in the system-call table is very common
among rootkits (see Table 1) since it provides the rootkit a convenient and reli-
able control of sensitive system calls. The critical kernel object that the rootkit
modifies is the system-call table which normally remains invariant throughout
the lifetime of a specific kernel version. The Linux kernel developers have actu-
ally placed this table in read-only memory, however the rootkit circumvents this
by remapping the underlining physical memory to new virtual memory pages
with write permissions.
Before installing the rootkit, we gave as input to our trusted module, the
address of the invariant system-call table and its size. Since Hello rootKitty is
an invariance-enforcing framework and not an invariance-discovering system, the
invariant critical kernel-objects and their size must be provided to it from an ex-
ternal source. This source can either be automatic invariance-discovering systems
or kernel programmers who wish to protect their data structures from malicious
modifications. Once our system was booted we loaded the rootkit in the running
kernel. When the next MOV to control-registered occured, the system trapped
into the hypervisor and Hello rootKitty detected the change on the invariant
system-call table. After reporting the attack, the system repaired the system-
call table by restoring the system-call entry with the original memory address.
This means, that while the rootkit’s code is still loaded in kernel-memory it is
no longer reachable by any statement and thus inactive.
This shows, that Hello rootKitty can detect rootkits and repair the kernel
provided that a) the kernel objects used by the rootkit to achieve control are
invariant and b) the utilized kernel objects are included in the list of invariance
that is given to our system.
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4.2 Performance benchmarks
According to slabtop, a Linux utility which displays kernel slab cache infor-
mation, approximately 15,000 kernel objects are allocated during system’s life-
time, 75% of which smaller than 128 bytes. These numbers are never exceeded
in other detection systems. Thus in order to measure the overhead introduced
by our countermeasure we instrumented the trusted module to create 15,000
kernel objects each of 128 bytes and then performed different types of bench-
marks. In order to avoid checking all 15,000 objects at each VMExit we check
each time a different subset of the object set. This parameter is configurable
and its value depends on the priorities of each installation (performance versus
detection time). We measure real (wall-clock) timings in a virtualized environ-
ment to compensate for the inaccuracy of time measurements within the virtual
machine (i.e. the guest’s timers are paused when the hypervisor is perform-
ing any other operation). We collected results from ApacheBench [1] sending
requests on a local webserver running lighttpd (Table 3) and from SPECINT
2000 as macrobenchmarks to estimate the delay perceived by the user (Table 4).
Lastly, we collected accurate timings of microbenchmarks from lmbench (Table
2). The macrobenchmarks show that our system imposes neglibible overhead on
the SPEC applications (0.005%) allowing its widespread adoption as a security
mechanism in virtualized systems.
Microbenchmarks show a consistent overhead on process forking, as expected.
In Table 2 we do not report measurements of context switching latencies because
the numbers produced by this benchmark are inaccurate [27,12]. An improve-
ment of local communication bandwidth is due to the slower context switching
which has the side effect of slightly increasing the troughtput of file or mmap
re-reading operations.
4.3 Memory overhead
Memory overhead is proportional to the number of protected objects. The data
structure needed to store information for integrity checking is 20 bytes long (64-
bit kernel object physical address, 32-bit kernel object size, 32-bit checksum,
32-bit support flags used by the hypervisor) 3. Protecting 15,000 objects costs
193KB when the original content is not provided and 2168 KB otherwise. More-
over, every time a subset of the list of objects is checked the hypervisor needs to
map each object from the guest physical space to its virtual space. In our proof
of concept the hypervisor will map 100 objects of 128 bytes each every time
a MOV CR event is trapped. This has an additional cost of 13KB. Thus the
overall cost in terms of memory is approximately 206KB (2181KB if a copy of
the original content is provided). Since the regular hypervisor allocates 128MB
at system startup, the memory overhead is 1.5%. The trusted module needs the
same amount of memory. But since it will free previously allocated memory after
raising the hypercall, that memory would be regularly used by the kernel.
3 In order to repair the compromised object, the hypervisor needs to store the object’s
original content too. This may increase the memory overhead.
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Benchmark no counterm.(sec) Hello rootKitty(sec) Perf. overh.
164.gzip 204 204 0%
175.vpr 138 142 2.8%
176.gcc 88.7 89.0 0.3%
181.mcf 86.4 86.7 0.34%
197.parser 206 207 0.5%
256.bzip2 179 179 0%
300.twolf 229 229 0%
Average 161.6 162.4 0.005%
Table 4. SPEC2000 benchmarks of Hello rootKitty in action
4.4 Detection Time
Due to the relaxation of integrity checking introduced in the earlier sections,
it is possible that the modified critical kernel object will not be in the current
subset that Hello rootKitty checks. The current prototype of our system checks
a subset of 100 objects at every change of a Control Register. For the total of
15,000 objects, this means that in the worst case scenario Hello rootKitty will
detect the malicious modification 149 process switches later than the moment it
happened. We found out that in a normally loaded system, this corresponds to
approximately 6 seconds of wall-clock time. We believe that this is an acceptable
security trade-off for the performance benefits that relaxation offers.
5 Limitations
In this section we describe the limitations and possible weak points of our coun-
termeasure. Since Hello rootKitty checks the critical kernel objects for invariance
at every change of a Control Register (CR*), an attacker can possibly com-
promise the scheduler of the operating system and avoid task switching, thus
avoiding changes of the CR3. The problem with this attack is that it effectively
freezes the system, since the control can’t be returned back from the kernel to
the running applications. A rootkit’s main goal is to hide itself from adminis-
trators thus any rootkit behaving this way will a) reveal that there is something
wrong in the kernel of the running operating system and b) will never be able to
intercept system calls of running processes. These facts suggest that while the
attack is possible, it is not probable.
Another attack might occur because of the relaxation explained in Section
3.2 which improves the performance overhead but comes with a cost in terms
of detection time. Since at any MOV CR event the hypervisor will check the
integrity of a subset of objects, several malicious processes in the guest might
compromise the kernel and restore the original contents before the hypervisor
performs the checking. We consider such an attack hard to accomplish because,
although the hypervisor performs integrity checking in a deterministic fashion,
the attacker has no information about the position of the compromised object
in the hypervisor’s memory space. A possible mitigation for this kind of attack
is the randomization of the sequence in which blocks are checked.
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A third possible way to compromise the guest kernel would be by corrupt-
ing critical kernel objects whose values legitimately change during the kernel’s
lifetime. Such objects are not invariant and thus can’t be included in the list
of objects that Hello rootKitty checks since our system is unable to differen-
tiate legitimate from non-legitimate changes. The majority though of existing
kernel-mode rootkits modify invariant data structures thus our system reduces
considerably the rootkit attack surface and prevents most rootkits from perform-
ing a successful attack.
Lastly, Hello rootKitty depends on invariance inference engines to provide
an accurate list of invariant critical kernel objects. Thus, if the inference engine
used doesn’t provide all the invariant critical kernel objects (false negatives),
Hello rootKitty will be unable to detect attacks that occur in the non-reported
kernel objects.
6 Related work
A number of efforts exist on detecting and preventing kernel malware. In this sec-
tion we explore related work that attempts to protect a kernel using specialized
hardware, virtualization, code integrity and profiling.
Hardware-based countermeasures Copilot [18] is a kernel integrity mon-
itor which detects illegal modications to a hosts kernel by fetching physical mem-
ory pages where kernel data and code is stored. Although the monitor has negligi-
ble overhead, it needs a separate PCI-card to fetch pages of the running kernel.
Gibraltar [2] is a system to infer kernel data structure invariants by fetching
snapshots of kernel memory in a way similar to Copilot, by using a PCI-card.
The violation of the inferred invariants is reported as a potential attack. While
detecting malicious behavior, those countermeasures are limited by the usage of
special hardware. A wide deployment of such systems is harder to achieve.
Kernel code integrity A countermeasure specifically designed to prevent
the execution of unauthorized code is described in [24]. The system comes in
the form of a tiny hypervisor which protects legacy OSes and ensures that only
validated code of the guest can execute in kernel mode. Another rootkit preven-
tion system is NICKLE [22], which prevents unauthorized kernel code execution
via memory shadowing. The hypervisor maintains a shadow physical memory to
store authenticated guest kernel code. At runtime it determines if the instruc-
tion fetch is for kernel or user mode. After verifying the code it will route the
instruction fetch accordingly to shadow or standard memory. Kernel rootkit at-
tacks would be detected and prevented since invalidated code would attempt to
run in kernel mode.
A recent attack to bypass countermeasures against code injection attacks,
such as the Non-Executable stack countermeasure, is Return Oriented Program-
ming (ROP) [25]. In ROP, the attacker, instead of injecting malicious code in
the address space of a vulnerable process, crafts his malicious payload by com-
bining fragments of existing code. This method of attacking has been used to
create return-oriented rootkits which re-use fragments of authorized kernel code
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for malicious purposes [10]. Such rootkits can bypass countermeasures like the
ones proposed by [22,24].
Yin et al. [32] protect kernel function pointers from being compromised by rootk-
its. The approach consists of an analysis and a detection subsystems. The anal-
ysis subsystem keeps track of function pointer propagation in kernel memory
via a whole-system emulator and generates the policy for hook detection. The
detection subsystem resides on the target machine and detects violations of the
inferred policy. Although the described countermeasure is binary-centric and
can generate a hook detection policy without modifying any guest source code,
it can be disabled by a rootkit attack since the detection system resides in the
target machine. A countermeasure which protects kernel hooks dynamically allo-
cated from the heap is described in [29]. Since protection of kernel objects needs
byte-level granularity, obviously finer than the page-level granularity provided
by commodity hardware, this countermeasure relocates kernel hooks to be pro-
tected to a dedicated page and then exploits the regular page-level protection of
the MMU. Although the overhead is negligible, rootkit attacks that compromise
non-control data would not be prevented.
Analysis and profiling systems Malware analysis can reveal important
information about the way a rootkit compromises data structures or how private
data are stolen, allowing researchers to understand rootkit’s behavior and design
effective countermeasures. A virtual machine monitor designed for malware anal-
ysis as described in [14] extracts features like memory pages, system calls, disk
and network accesses from the analyzed program running in the guest. Wang et
al. [30] is an analysis tool against persistent rootkits, which compromise kernel
hooks for hiding purposes. Those kernel hooks are first identified by monitoring
the kernel-side execution path of system utility programs (e.g. ps, ls) and then
reported as potential targets. Identification of kernel hooks and extraction of
the hook implanting mechanisms via dynamic analysis is proposed in [31]. A
whole-system emulator is used rather than a virtual machine monitor. A rootkit
proler is described in [23]. A VMM is used to log the rootkit hooking behavior,
to monitor targeted kernel objects, to extract kernel rootkit code and infer the
potential impact on user-level programs.
Hello rootKitty can be easily integrated with the systems described above
in order to perform integrity checking and detect illegal changes to those kernel
objects collected by the analysis tools.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrated how the guaranteed isolation between a hy-
pervisor and a guest operating system can be used to build a non-bypassable
invariance-enforcing framework. We realized our idea by designing and imple-
menting Hello rootKitty, a lightweight countermeasure to mitigate kernel-mode
rootkits in common operating system kernels. Upon detection of a change of an
invariant kernel object, Hello rootKitty alerts the administrator of the guest op-
erating system and proceeds to repair the kernel by restoring the data structure
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to its original values. Due to this change, the rootkit’s injected code is no longer
reachable by any statements in the kernel and thus can no longer affect the
running kernel’s operations. The evaluation of our prototype showed that Hello
rootKitty can detect control-flow changes used by modern rootkits with negligi-
ble performance and memory overhead, making it a viable countermeasure for
protecting operating systems in virtualized environments.
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